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"Golden parachutes" are special termination agreements that shelter
executives from the effects of a corporate takeover.' Typically, golden
parachutes are "triggered" by a change in control of the corporation.2
Once operative, they provide executives who are dismissed or who, under
certain circumstances, resign as a result of a takeover with either contin-
ued compensation for a specified period following the executives' depar-
ture or with a lump-sum payment.3
Although relatively new,4 golden parachutes are rapidly becoming com-
monplace." Notwithstanding the recent popularity of golden parachutes,
however, their legality and desirability as a form of executive compensa-
tion have been challenged by many who believe that golden parachutes
are nothing more than corporate looting. Stockholders have mounted court
challenges but have not yet obtained any definitive decision on the merits;'
1. For a more detailed description of golden parachutes, see R. WINTER, M. STUMPF & G.
HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES 425-28 (1983) [hereinafter cited as R.
WINTER]; see also infra pp. 910-12.
2. Definitions of the "change of control" that triggers a golden parachute or makes operative the
change-of-control provisions of a regular employment contract fall into two basic categories: those
defining a change in the company's status (often called change-of-control clauses), and those defining
a change in the protected executive's status (often called termination clauses). These two types of
triggering mechanisms often are used in combination. Ward Howell International, Inc., Survey of
Employment Contracts and "Golden Parachutes" Among the Fortune 1,000, at 2, 3 (Dec. 29, 1983)
(on file with the Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Ward Howell Survey].
3. According to Ward Howell's survey of Fortune 1,000 companies using golden parachutes,
44.8% offered golden parachutes consisting of lump-sum payments. There were no lump-sum pay-
ments at 46.2% of the companies, and at 9.1% payment form was not specified. Of the contracts
providing lump-sum payments, 39% did so only if the company terminated the executive, while 21.8%
did so simply if the executive left because of the change, including resignation as well as termination.
Ward Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 4.
Compensation components of the golden parachutes surveyed typically included base salary (76.9%
of contracts), bonus (53.8% of contracts), and stock option acceleration (39.2% of contracts). Lump-
sum payments were usually some multiple of a year's compensation. At 11.9% of the companies,
compensation was not measured in years of pay because it consisted only of bonuses or of stock
options. Id.
4. Until recently, only a few management compensation contracts contained the takeover clauses
characteristic of golden parachutes. McLaughlin, The Myth of the Golden Parachute, MERGERS &
ACQuISIIONS, Summer 1982, at 47.
5. At the beginning of 1984, 48% of the American corporations in the Fortune 1,000 protected
their top officers with employment contracts, an increase of 20% over 1982. Of those employment
contracts, 49% contained some change-of-control clause. At that time, 29% of all employment contracts
contained specific change-of-control triggers and thus could be considered golden parachutes. Ward
Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 1.
6. No case involving golden parachutes has dealt directly with their legality. See, e.g., Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1984) (issue of whether management breached
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Congress has attempted to tax golden parachutes out of existence;7 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed legislation to limit the
use of golden parachutes.' In addition, a growing number of commenta-
tors question the legitimacy of compensating executives through golden
parachutes.9
This Note proposes a standard of review for courts to apply in assessing
the legality of specific golden parachutes. After briefly describing golden
parachutes and their current legal status, the Note demonstrates that
properly crafted golden parachutes can serve a legitimate economic func-
tion. Having defined that function, the Note discusses the controversy sur-
rounding golden parachutes and argues that the evidence against golden
parachutes is not sufficient to warrant a blanket prohibition of all such
agreements. The Note then sets forth a standard which will allow courts
to distinguish those golden parachutes that serve a legitimate economic
function from those that are improperly drafted or wasteful.
I. BACKGROUND OF GOLDEN PARACHUTES
A. Description
Most golden parachutes currently in effect have three key components:
(1) a change-of-control clause, (2) a termination clause, and (3) a com-
pensation clause.'0 The change-of-control clause defines when the golden
fiduciary duty through use of golden parachutes found not properly before court); Wolgin v. Simon,
722 F.2d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 1983) (golden parachute issue avoided on procedural grounds); Lewis v.
Anderson, 453 A.2d 474, 480 (Del. Ch. 1982) (case dismissed because plaintiff lacked standing).
7. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494 (to be codified at
I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999), places strict limitations on the deductibility to corporations of golden para-
chute benefits and, under certain circumstances, imposes a 20% excise tax on the benefits received by
the executive. The legislation clearly reflects Congress' belief that golden parachutes are not desirable.
See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 849-54, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 751, 843-47. For a more detailed description of the provisions of the Act dealing with golden
parachutes, see infra note 84.
8. If enacted, the SEC's proposed legislation would bar the implementation of golden parachutes
during a tender offer. See H.R. 5698, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 4,359 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Ripcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special
Termination Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15 (1982); Note, Golden Parachutes-Executive Compen-
sation or Executive Overreaching, 9 J. CORP. L. 346 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Executive
Overreaching]; Comment, Golden Parachutes: A Perk That Boards Should Scrutinize Carefully, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 293 (1984); Note, Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts in
the Wake of a Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 516 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Cushion-
ing Executives]; Note, Future Executive Bail Outs: Will Golden Parachutes Fill The American Busi-
ness Skies?, 14 TEX. TEcs. L. REV. 615 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Bail Outs]; Note, Golden
Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Employment Contracts].
10. For a summary of the common provisions contained in each of the three components of golden
parachutes, see Profusek, Executive Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REV.
99, 112-15 (1983); see also Ward Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 1-10 (describing common
provisions).
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parachute becomes operative." Typically, a change of control is defined as
an outside party's acquisition of a certain percentage of stock or as a
change in the composition of the board of directors.12 The termination
clause defines when executives may terminate their employment contracts
and receive their golden parachute payments once a change in control has
occurred. 13 The terms of such clauses vary widely; 14 some require that the
11. Profusek, supra note 10, at 105-07.
12. The following is an example of a change-of-control clause that triggers a golden parachute if
a specified amount of the corporation's outstanding securities is acquired by a single purchaser:
Provided that, without limitation, such a change in control shall be deemed to have occurred
if and when any "person" (as that term is used in Sections 13(d) and 14(d)(2) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934) becomes a beneficial owner directly or indirectly of securities of the
Company representing 20% or more of the combined voting power of the Company's then
outstanding securities.
R. WINTER, supra note 1, at 439 (quoting from Champion Int'l Corp., Form 10-K Report for year
ended Dec. 31, 1980).
The provision below is an example of a change-of-control clause that triggers a golden parachute if
there is a change in the composition of the corporation's board of directors:
The term control shall mean . . . any change in the composition of the Board of Directors
of the Company resulting in a majority of the present directors of the Company not constitut-
ing a majority two years hence, provided, that in making such determination directors who
were elected by, or on the recommendation of, such present majority, shall be excluded.
Id. at 440 (quoting from Mohasco Corp., Form 10-K Report for year ended Dec. 31, 1980).
Some change-of-control provisions combine the two approaches described above:
A Change in Control shall mean. . . the acquisition by any corporation or group of associ-
ated persons acting in concert, excluding affiliates, if any, of the Company as of the date
hereof, of an aggregate of more than 25% of the outstanding shares of voting stock of the
Company coupled with or followed by the election as directors of the Company of persons who
were not directors at the time of such acquisition if such persons shall become a majority of the
Board of Directors of the Company.
Id. at 441 (quoting from Kennametal Inc., Form 10-K Report for year ended June 30, 1981).
13. Profusek, supra note 10, at 107.
14. Below are three examples of termination clauses, each affording a different degree of protec-
tion to the executive:
Executive may, at his election and upon 90 days' prior written notice to the Company,
terminate his employment in the event that (a) Executive shall in his absolute judgment deter-
mine that due to changed circumstances occurring on or after the Effective Date he is unable
effectively to carry out his duties and responsibilities as contemplated hereby ....
R. WINTER, supra note 1, at 461 (quoting from Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., Form 10-K Report for
year ended Dec. 31, 1981).
In the event that Employee should determine in good faith that his status or responsibilities
with the Company has or have diminished subsequent to a Change in Control, and shall for
that reason resign from his employment with the Company within two years after such
Change in Control, Employee shall be entitled to receive all of the payments and enjoy all of
the benefits specified in Section 2 hereof.
Id. (quoting from Union Commerce Corp., Form 10-K Report for year ended Dec. 31, 1981).
Without your express written consent, a change in your reporting responsibilities, titles or
offices as in effect immediately prior to a Change in Control, or any removal of you from or
any failure to re-elect you to any of such positions, except in connection with the termination
of your employment for Cause, Disability or Retirement or as a result of your death or by you
other than for Good Reason.
Id. at 462 (quoting from Martin Marietta Corp., Schedule 14D-9, filed Aug. 1982). Other clauses
contain provisions allowing executives to terminate their employment if they are required to move
from their current employment location or if their salary or benefits are substantially reduced. See id.
at 462-63.
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executive actually be dismissed, while others give the executive an uncon-
ditional right to terminate employment after a takeover has occurred. The
compensation clause provides executives with a lump-sum payment or a
continuation of base salary and benefits for a specified period.15 These
payments are intended to compensate executives for displacement losses.1 6
B. Current Legal Status
Most commentators agree that the "business judgment rule" of current
corporation law applies to golden parachutes.' 7 In general, the business
judgment rule requires that courts defer to the good faith business judg-
ment of the board of directors.' 8 The rule is based on a belief that judicial
deference to board decisions is necessary to encourage boards to take risks
and exercise their best judgment; risk-taking and sound judgment may be
impaired, it is felt, if boards fear their decisions might be second-guessed
15. Profusek, supra note 10, at 108.
16. The displacement losses suffered by executives include the loss of the power and prestige that
are incidental to running a company, as well as the loss of salary executives incur while searching for
new jobs. Since it is impossible to replace directly the power and prestige displaced executives lose,
golden parachutes typically provide pecuniary payments in excess of the loss in salary an executive is
likely to experience. The following is a typical golden parachute compensation clause:
The Corporation will promptly pay you upon your request as termination compensation in
a lump sum amount . . . equal to two times the highest annual base salary (not including
bonuses under the Corporation's Incentive Compensation Plan) paid or payable by the Corpo-
ration to you for the three calendar years ending with the year of such termination, except that
in the event there are fewer than 24 months remaining from the date of such termination to
your normal retirement date, the lump sum compensation shall equal such highest annual base
salary times the fraction the numerator of which is the number of months so remaining to your
normal retirement date and the denominator of which is 12.
R. WINTER, supra note 1, at 468 (quoting from Phelps Dodge Corporation, Form 10-Q Report for
quarter ended June 30, 1981).
17. One commentator has noted that "it appears likely the courts will (and should) follow the
usual business judgment rule with regard to golden parachute contracts." Herzel, Golden Parachute
Contracts: Analysis, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 20, 23. See also Profusek, supra note 10, at 103
(suggesting that business judgment rule applies); Note, Executive Overreaching, supra note 9, at 348
(same); Comment, supra note 9, at 311 (same); Note, Cushioning Executives, supra note 9, at 530
(same); Note, Bail Outs, supra note 9, at 624 (same). But see Riger, supra note 9, at 35-39 (arguing
that a fairness standard should apply).
18. In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), the court described the business judgment rule as follows:
[djirectors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties when in good faith they exercise
business judgment in making decisions regarding the corporation. When they act in good faith,
they enjoy a presumption of sound business judgment, reposed in them as directors, which
courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their decisions. In
the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not inter-
fere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.
Id. at 293 (quoting lower court opinion at 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (citations omit-
ted)). See also 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039
(M. Wolf rev. ed. 1975) (discussing business judgment rule); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS 661 (3d ed. 1983) (same).
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by the courts, which normally have the benefit of hindsight but only lim-
ited business experience.' 9 This policy of judicial deference gives boards of
directors broad discretion in making corporate decisions.20 Consequently,
the majority of existing golden parachutes will probably pass judicial
scrutiny if challenged,2" although insufficient case law currently exists to
corroborate this assertion. 2
Commentators who dispute the legality of golden parachutes argue that
these agreements are not supported by adequate consideration.23 They as-
sert that the ostensible benefits of golden parachutes, such as management
objectivity toward takeover attempts and the attraction and retention of
quality executives, do not provide adequate consideration for the large
payments that golden parachutes typically award displaced executives.24
The assertion, however, stems from a lack of understanding of the eco-
nomic function golden parachutes serve.25 As discussed below, golden
19. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 183, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968). Judicial
deference under the business judgment rule to board decisions concerning executive compensation and,
in particular, the implementation of golden parachutes has been criticized by many who believe that
boards are incapable of making objective decisions concerning executive compensation. See, e.g., M.
MACE, DIRECroRS: MYTH AND REALrT 108 (1971) (directors not likely to "rock the boat"); Brud-
ney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REv. 597,
610-22 (1982); Moscow, The Independent Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 11 (1972); Loomis, The Mad-
ness of Executive Compensation, FORTUNE, July 12, 1982, at 42:
It is widely believed that many compensation committees are rubber stamps, unwilling to be
hard-nosed about the pay of top executives, particularly those chaps who are fellow members
of the board. Any reader of this article can imagine what his own attitude would be if he were
required to sit in semi-public judgment on the salaries of his peers, some of whom were good
friends. He would likely avoid harsh judgments and, in the end, be generous to a fault, partic-
ularly if he had the privilege of using money not his own.
Id. at 45.
Many commentators believe that boards are not impartial because they are dominated by officers of
the corporation. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corpo-
ration: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAUF. L. REv. 375, 376-84 (1975) (because of time
constraints, information constraints, composition, selection, and tenure, boards of directors seldom ex-
ercise much control over or have significant influence on officers of corporation); W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATsONS 173 (5th ed. 1980); J. JURAN & J.
LOUDEN, THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR 287-89 (1966). This lack of board independence, it is argued,
leads to a situation different from that contemplated by the business judgment rule, which assumes
that directors are making impartial, good faith business decisions free from the influence of parties
with vested interests. These criticisms have led to proposals ranging from the adoption of a stricter
judicial standard of review, see, e.g., Note, Cushioning Executives, supra note 9, at 535-41 (sug-
gesting use of fairness standard), to discussions over the possible need for federal legislation, see
Moore, Congress Takes Dim View of Golden Parachutes, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 25, 1982, at 5,
col. 2.
20. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 183, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968).
21. "[S]ince there are proper motives for these contracts [golden parachutes], courts are unlikely to
substitute their own judgments for those of directors except in situations involving particularly inept
or outrageous conduct." Herzel, supra note 17, at 23.
22. See supra note 6.
23. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 9, at 25-35.
24. Id.
25. Some commentators believe that golden parachutes serve no valid economic purpose. One
critic of golden parachutes has stated that a golden parachute, "seen clearly, is no more than the self-
serving effort by executives, with de facto control over position and pay, to preserve these in the face
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parachutes are intended to compensate executives for their efforts by shift-
ing to the corporation a risk that the executives would otherwise bear.
The benefits that accrue to the corporation are incidental to this form of
compensation, not the consideration given for it."6
II. ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF GOLDEN PARACHUTES
The primary economic function of golden parachutes is to compensate
executives through risk shifting. Because there are many other forms of
compensation,27 the mere fact that golden parachutes can be utilized to
compensate executives does not in itself make them particularly useful.
Compensating executives through the risk shifting facilitated by golden
parachutes, however, serves additional economic functions that other
forms of compensation cannot. The two most important functions are the
reduction of agency costs and the attraction of executives to industries
with high displacement risks. An understanding of the economic functions
of golden parachutes will help courts assess the legality of specific golden
parachute provisions.
A. Reducing Agency Costs
The importance of risk shifting, and thus of compensating executives
through golden parachutes, stems from the concept of agency costs.2" Since
executives normally do not own the corporations they manage,2 their in-
terests may diverge from those of stockholders."0 While investors can pro-
tect themselves from firm-specific risk through diversification,"1 executives
of a takeover, with special benefits for themselves at corporate expense if the effort fails." Id. at 33.
26. Consider the following analogy: A corporation could compensate its executives by providing
them with new clothing. One incidental benefit of such a form of compensation might be the enhanced
appearance of the corporation's executives. This benefit would not, however, be the consideration
given by the executives in return for the clothing. The consideration would be the effort exerted on
behalf of the corporation by the executives. Similarly, the consideration given for golden parachutes is
the effort of executives on behalf of the corporation. The incentives that golden parachutes arguably
create are incidental benefits of using this form of executive compensation.
27. Forms of executive compensation include salary, insurance, stock options, percentage bonuses,
and pensions. For a discussion of the compensation practices of corporations, see Vagts, Challenges to
Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 247-51 (1983) (dis-
cussing studies of executive compensation).
28. The term "agency costs" was introduced in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
29. The usual separation of ownership from control in modern corporations has long been a rec-
ognized fact. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
4-5, 66, 68 (1932).
30. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 308.
31. Investment returns are normally evaluated on the basis of risk and return. J. VAN HORNE,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 15 (4th ed. 1977). Return is defined in terms of the cash
returns expected during a given period. Id. at 20. Risk is a measure of the possibility that the actual
returns over the period will differ from those which are expected. Id. at 15. Risk consists of two
components: market risk (or changes in returns due to general market conditions) and firm-specific
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usually cannot.3" Executives may thus oppose a transaction that benefits
the stockholders if the transaction is not personally beneficial.33 For exam-
ple, executives who believe that a successful takeover will lead to their
replacement may engage in defensive tactics designed to thwart the take-
over. Moreover, they may do so even if the takeover would be beneficial to
the stockholders.3 4 Defensive tactics range from relatively innocuous
changes in the articles of incorporation to costly measures that can devas-
tate the firm, such as selling off valuable assets or entering into undesir-
able contracts that are contingent on a change of control. 5 As a conse-
quence of this possible divergence of interests, corporations incur agency
costs, which include the costs of monitoring and restricting management
behavior as well as the lost profits that result when executives fail to max-
imize profits. 6 According to neoclassical economic theory, corporations
desire to minimize agency costs; 37 golden parachutes provide one means of
achieving this corporate goal.
risks (changes in returns due to factors that are unique to the individual company). Id. at 61.
Since companies face different kinds of firm-specific risk, investors can eliminate these risks by
diversifying, i.e., holding the securities of many different companies. During a given period, some
companies will do better than expected while others will do worse. By holding stock in many compa-
nies, investors will be less likely to experience substantial fluctuations in their expected returns as a
consequence of the actual performance of any given firm, because the lower-than-expected returns of
some firms will be offset by the higher-than-expected returns of others. R. BREALY & S. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 119-21 (1981).
32. To diversify away the firm-specific risk associated with their investments of human capital in
their employer, executives would have to spread their human capital around by working part-time for
a number of different firms. Since this is practically impossible, executives are forced to bear the firm-
specific risks associated with their investments.
33. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1175 (1981).
34. Id. at 1174-75.
35. For a list and description of the more common defensive tactics, see 1 M. LIPTON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 263-325 (1978). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN,
& G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977)
(describing various tactics used to thwart tender offers). A great deal has been written concerning the
propriety of defensive tactics. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 33; Fischel,
Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boar-
droom: An Update after One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy
of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979); Steinbrink, Management's
Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882 (1978); Wachtell, Special Tender
Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433 (1977); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law
Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068 (1983).
36. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 308; Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the
Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 55, 66 (1979).
37. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 28, at 308.
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The emergence of golden parachutes is attributable to the increased in-
cidence of corporate takeovers.3 8 When a takeover occurs, it is common-
place for the senior executives of the firm to be replaced."9 Consequently,
the recent increase in the number and size of takeovers40 has exposed ex-
ecutives to greater risk of displacement or frustration of career expecta-
tions.4 ' As a result, executive job security has declined, reducing the ex-
pected value of existing executive compensation packages.42 The reduction
in the expected value of executive compensation creates disequilibrium:
The value of executives' compensation packages falls while the value of
executives' services remains constant.43 Executives thus have an incentive
to increase the expected value of their compensation by seeking employ-
ment elsewhere. Corporations can respond in one of three ways: (1) in-
crease executives' immediate benefits or pecuniary compensation, (2) do
nothing, or (3) shift the increased risk from the executives to the corpora-
tion by providing golden parachutes.
The risk-shifting nature of golden parachutes makes them the most rea-
sonable of the above alternatives for dealing with the disequilibrium
caused by increased takeover activity. Although increasing immediate ben-
efits and pecuniary income compensates executives for diminished job se-
curity, this solution provides no incentive for managers to refrain from
further reducing their risk of displacement by engaging in costly defensive
38. McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 47 (increased use of golden parachutes understandable in light
of increase in merger activity); Morrison, Compensation: Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE,
Dec. 13, 1982, at 82 (increased merger activity has resulted in more and more golden parachute
clauses appearing in executive employment contracts); Moore, Golden Parachute Agreements Shelter
Displaced Executives, Legal Times of Wash., Oct. 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (golden parachutes have
prospered in era of hostile takeovers); Klein, Controversial Perk. A Golden Parachute Protects Exec-
utives, But Does It Hinder or Foster Takeover?, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1 (increased
merger activity explains prevalence of golden parachutes).
39. Perham, Surge in Executive Job Contracts, DUN'S Bus. MONTHLY, Oct. 1981, at 87 (study
showed 52% of target company executives either leave or are fired within three years after takeover).
See also HAYES, HAYES/HILL INCORPORATED: STUDY OF EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT (1981) (42%
of target management is all that remains five years after successful takeover); Holding On in a Take-
over, Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1982, at 118 (of 1300 executives who lost jobs during 18 month period
ending August 31, 1982, 32% were displaced during or after change in control of their respective
corporations).
40. In 1981, for example, there were 2,313 merger transactions with a total value of $73 billion.
Merger Review, MERGERS & AcQussrrsONs, Spring 1982, at 6. This was a record-breaking dollar
amount. Id. Although the total number of takeovers per year is still below the numbers reached
during the 1960's, the volume of hostile takeovers and the size of takeovers have increased. Note,
Enployment Contracts, supra note 9, at 1117 n.1.
41. See supra note 39.
42. The expected value of an executive compensation package is a function of the amount pro-
vided under the package and the certainty that the amount will be paid. If the certainty of payment is
decreased while the amount to be paid remains constant, the overall value of the package will decline.
43. Equilibrium describes a situation in which opposing forces are balanced. In the case of execu-
tive employment, equilibrium exists when both the corporation and its executives give up something
equal in worth to that which they receive in return. When the value of the compensation given execu-
tives decreases while the value of the executives' services remains constant, disequilibrium occurs. The
self-interest of executives will create pressures for re-establishing equilibrium.
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tactics designed to thwart a takeover attempt. The second possibility, do-
ing nothing, creates an incentive for executives either to seek other em-
ployment or to reduce displacement risk through defensive tactics. Provid-
ing golden parachutes, in contrast, shifts most of the displacement risk
from the executives to the corporation, reducing executives' incentives to
oppose takeovers that are beneficial to the corporation. Golden parachutes
are therefore a useful means of reducing agency costs.
B. Attracting Executives to Industries with High Displacement Risks
Golden parachutes are also useful in providing long-term incentives for
executives to enter industries in which the potential displacement losses
from takeovers are above average,"" although this is not their primary
function. Absent golden parachutes or other protections, executives may
hesitate to invest their human capital in corporations that require the ac-
quisition of a great deal of firm-specific knowledge and experience, be-
cause such knowledge and experience cannot be transferred if the execu-
tives are displaced by a takeover. By shifting takeover risk to the
corporation, golden parachutes enable firms that require their managers
to become very specialized to attract talented executives.
The increased displacement risks that highly specialized executives bear
obviously can be offset in a number of ways, including increases in imme-
diate cash compensation. Golden parachutes, however, enable corporations
to hold all other forms of compensation equal among executives while still
compensating particular executives for increased displacement risk. This
avoids the problems of devising a compensation system that all of the
firm's executives will perceive as fair even though executives whose re-
sponsibilities and seniority are similar may be paid different amounts be-
cause some are more specialized than others. Moreover, using golden
parachutes to shift the risks of specialization from executives to the corpo-
ration avoids a potential moral hazard: An executive who receives imme-
diate compensation for bearing greater specialization risks may still try to
avoid such risks by failing to become as specialized as would be optimal
for the firm, even though the executive has already been compensated for
so doing.
44. "Executives in specialized firms (monopolies or firms that are serving very special niches) are
more apt to qualify for golden parachutes than those in competitively organized industries where
experience in one firm easily transfers to another." Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J.
1197, 1218 n.63 (1984).
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In summary, the economic function of golden parachutes is to compen-
sate executives through risk shifting and thereby to achieve other corpo-
rate goals, such as minimizing agency costs and attracting talented execu-
tives.45 In some respects, golden parachutes are analogous to other forms
of compensation which provide remuneration through risk shifting. For
example, a company's accident insurance plan compensates employees by
shifting the risk of loss that would otherwise be borne by the employees.
The value of the compensation provided by the insurance is equal to the
premium that employees would otherwise have to pay to receive similar
protection from a third party. Similarly, an executive who is covered by a
golden parachute receives compensation, whether or not her company is
actually taken over, when each year the corporation in effect pays her
annual takeover insurance premium. The value of this compensation is
the amount the executive theoretically would have to pay in order to re-
ceive such insurance from another source.46
III. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING GOLDEN PARACHUTES
Despite the unique ability of golden parachutes to reduce agency costs
through risk shifting, many commentators support legislative intervention
or strict judicial review to limit severely the use of golden parachutes.4
These commentators variously assert that golden parachutes (1) are inef-
fective in creating the executive objectivity4" necessary to reduce agency
45. Some commentators have argued that an additional purpose of golden parachutes is to ward
off undesirable takeover attempts. See Cooper, The Spread of Golden Parachutes, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Aug. 1982, at 65, 68; Klein, supra note 38, at 56, col. 1. They argue that golden
parachutes reduce the likelihood that a corporation will be taken over by increasing the cost of such a
takeover.
By requiring the corporation to compensate displaced or demoted executives for their losses, golden
parachutes may in fact increase the cost of a takeover. With few exceptions, however, the cost of
golden parachutes relative to the total cost of a takeover is very small-below one percent. Morrison,
Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 86. It is, therefore, unlikely that golden
parachutes are generally an efficacious means of avoiding a takeover. See id. Martin Lipton of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz has opined that a corporation's implementation of a reasonable
number of golden parachutes has "no deterrent effect whatsoever on takeover attempts." Id. Indeed,
golden parachutes may actually encourage takeovers by reducing senior executives' opposition to them.
46. At least two companies now offer "tender offer defense expense insurance" to defray the costs
target companies incur in resisting a takeover attempt. See Business Management Liability Insurance
Committee, Tender Offer Defense Insurance Policy, 37 Bus. LAW. 243 (1981); Aronson, Tender
Offer Defense Expense Insurance, BEST'S REV., June 1981, at 38; Lloyd's Offers U.S. Concerns
Insurance for Costs of Fighting Hostile Takeovers, Wall St. J., May 12, 1980, at 14, col. 2. Given
the willingness of insurers to make the difficult actuarial determinations necessary to offer such insur-
ance, it is possible that similar policies could be offered to protect executives from displacement losses.
The primary obstacle would be writing the policy so as to avoid the moral hazards involved. Insurers
would have to protect themselves from the possibility of an executive's taking out a policy after receiv-
ing inside information regarding a probable takeover.
47. See Riger, supra note 9, at 25-39; Note, Executive Overreaching, supra note 9, at 351-57;
Comment, supra note 9, at 299-310; Note, Employment Contracts, supra note 9, at 1117-37; Note,
Bail Outs, supra note 9, at 619-23.
48. "Executive objectivity" refers to a situation in which managers are able to evaluate the merits
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costs,4' (2) may create perverse incentives and thereby actually increase
agency costs,50 (3) reduce the discipline over executives which the market
for corporate control provides 1 and (4) are not necessary to attract execu-
tives to firms.52 The opponents of golden parachutes have not, however,
provided sufficient support for their assertions to warrant greatly restrict-
ing the use of golden parachutes. Indeed, a number of plausible argu-
ments support the use of golden parachutes.
A. Effectiveness of Golden Parachutes
The most common criticism of golden parachutes is that golden
parachutes are unlikely to compensate executives fully for displacement
losses and, thus, will not reduce agency costs by removing the incentives
for executives to engage in defensive tactics.53 It is, however, highly proba-
ble that golden parachutes will compensate reasonably competent manag-
ers sufficiently to create executive objectivity. Because of the close rela-
tionship between executives and directors, executives often influence
decisions concerning their own compensation. It is therefore unlikely that
of a takeover offer independent of its possible effect on themselves.
49. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 4, at 48.
50. See, e.g., Note, Bail Outs, supra note 9, at 619-23.
51. See, e.g., Note, Cushioning Executives, supra note 9, at 541.
52. See, e.g., Riger, supra note 9, at 28-29.
53. See Morrison, supra note 38, at 86; Cooper, supra note 45, at 68. It is argued that the loss of
prestige and power resulting from a takeover cannot be compensated adequately through pecuniary
payments and, therefore, that golden parachutes will not compensate displacement losses sufficiently
to create executive objectivity.
Possibly the most infamous takeover struggle in which executive objectivity was perhaps lacking
despite the existence of golden parachutes is a 1982 takeover attempt involving Bendix, Martin Mari-
etta, Allied Corporation, and United Technologies. When Bendix attempted to buy a control block of
Martin Marietta's stock, Martin Marietta teamed up with United Technologies and attempted a
"Pac-Man" defense by making a tender offer to acquire Bendix. Allied then came to Bendix's rescue
by acquiring Bendix. Despite the fact that Martin Marietta's executives were given golden
parachutes, the executives vigorously fought off Bendix's takeover attempt. As a result of borrowing to
finance purchases of Bendix's stock, Martin Marietta's debt was increased, thereby lowering its book
value, increasing its debt leverage and reducing its bond rating. In response to Martin Marietta's Pac-
Man defense, Bendix adopted golden parachutes covering 16 officers, including one golden parachute
which guaranteed Bendix's Chief Executive Officer, William Agee, $805,000 per year for five years to
be paid regardless of whether Agee was terminated after a takeover. Bendix justified these golden
parachutes as being necessary to ensure unbiased decisionmaking. William Agee has reportedly since
stated, however, that he would not have done anything differently had he not had a golden parachute.
Morrison, supra note 38, at 84; see also Tuab, Haste Maketh Waste, FINANCIAL WORLD, Dec. 1-15,
1982, at 17; Holusha, Bendix Chief Playing for High Stakes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 3;
Bendix Provides Salary Guarantees for 16 Officers, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
Commentators point to takeover attempts such as the Bendix example to support the argument that
golden parachutes do not create executive objectivity. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 38, at 84. As in
the Bendix case, however, most of the examples used involve takeovers in which the golden parachutes
given the executives were not implemented until the executives had already begun to oppose the take-
over. Rather than serving as risk-shifting devices to create objectivity, these golden parachutes most
likely were intended to serve as safety precautions against the possibility that the recalcitrant execu-
tives' takeover defenses would fail. Thus, these examples are not persuasive in predicting how execu-
tives who are given golden parachutes prior to a takeover attempt will respond to the attempt. For an
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corporations will adopt golden parachutes that the executives view as in-
adequate and that are, consequently, ineffective.
Moreover, even if some golden parachutes do not fully compensate ex-
ecutives, they probably provide sufficient compensation to prevent execu-
tives from engaging in the more damaging defensive tactics, such as selling
major assets and entering into undesirable contracts. 5' Executives who are
compensated for most of their displacement losses probably will not be
willing to risk their reputations by taking such drastic actions.5 ' By con-
trast, executives who have no golden parachutes will be more likely to risk
their reputations by opposing a desirable takeover, because the executives
stand to lose more if the takeover attempt is successful.
B. Possible Adverse Effects of Golden Parachutes
Other critics of golden parachutes have argued that the problem with
golden parachutes is not that they provide insufficient compensation to
create executive objectivity, but that they provide excessive compensation
and thereby increase agency costs by creating perverse incentives."' These
critics apparently believe that the close relationship between directors and
executives gives executives an opportunity to engage in self-dealing by de-
manding excessive golden parachutes." The close relationship between
executives and directors, however, taints all board decisions concerning ex-
ecutive compensation and has no special significance in the golden para-
chute context. Golden parachutes are merely one form of compensation
for which executives bargain. There is no reason to believe that, under
normal circumstances, an executive will bargain for an excessive golden
parachute, choosing to forego more immediate forms of income.
argument that the implementation of golden parachutes once a takeover has begun should be forbid-
den, see infra note 58.
54. The defensive tactics used by Brunswick Corporation to oppose a takeover attempt by Whitta-
ker Corporation illustrate the high costs of the more abusive types of defensive tactics. In early Janu-
ary 1982, Whittaker tried to acquire Brunswick by making a hostile tender offer for Brunswick's
stock. The motive for the takeover attempt was to gain control of a medical unit owned by Brunswick.
In response to the tender offer, Brunswick's management rejected Whittaker's $26.50-per-share offer
and sold the medical unit to a third party, making Brunswick less attractive to Whittaker. The sale of
one of Brunswick's valuable assets to avoid a takeover, however, was not without its costs. When the
dust settled, Brunswick's stock was selling for half the price of the original tender offer. Morrison,
supra note 38, at 84.
55. An executive's reputation, like any other asset which increases his marketability, has economic
value. An executive will choose not to engage in self-dealing if doing so will decrease the value of his
reputation by more than the return he expects the self-dealing to yield. Consequently, when an execu-
tive has little to gain from engaging in undesirable defensive tactics and a great deal to lose if the
tactics affect his reputation, the executive can be expected not to engage in defensive tactics. The
opposite is also true. For a persuasive analysis in another context of the economic value of a reputa-
tion for honesty, see Nelson, The Economics of Honest Trade Practices, 24 J. INDus. EcoN. 281
(1976).
56. See, e.g., Note, Bail Outs, supra note 9, at 621.
57. See id.
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There is, however, one special circumstance in which managers may
desire to bargain for an excessive golden parachute: When a takeover is
imminent, executives may try to receive all their compensation in the form
of a golden parachute. Fortunately, this possibility may soon be elimi-
nated. Congress currently is considering an SEC proposal to bar the im-
plementation of golden parachutes during a tender offer.58 Moreover, by
adopting the standard of review proposed later in this Note, courts can
easily prevent this kind of behavior.
C. Effect of Golden Parachutes on Market Discipline of Executives
Many commentators believe that the threat of a takeover gives execu-
tives an incentive to maximize stock prices and, consequently, shareholder
wealth. 59 Opponents of golden parachutes argue that golden parachutes
reduce this incentive by making takeovers more expensive-and therefore
less likely-and by sheltering executives from their consequences.6" If this
argument were correct, golden parachutes could actually increase agency
costs by eliminating a form of market discipline that tends to reduce
agency costs. In fact, however, the relative cost of golden parachutes com-
pared to the total cost of a takeover is low (below one percent) in most
cases and is unlikely to thwart an otherwise desirable takeover.6" Indeed,
since golden parachutes reduce executives' incentives to engage in costly
defensive tactics, 2 golden parachutes actually may reduce takeover costs.
Moreover, as long as golden parachutes provide compensation only for
the losses that conscientious executives are likely to incur as a result of
displacement, they will not undermine the market's tendency to discipline
slothful or dishonest executives. The market for corporate control is a
58. See supra note 8. Prohibiting the implementation of golden parachutes during a takeover is
probably desirable. During a takeover, executives will have significant bargaining power to demand
excessive golden parachutes in return for not opposing the transaction. Moreover, since both the exec-
utives and the directors probably will soon be replaced, they will have little concern over how the
stockholders may react to the golden parachutes. Finally, the golden parachutes will probably be of
diminished value in creating executive objectivity, since the executives already will have taken an
initial position on the takeover when the golden parachutes are adopted and may not be able to
modify their position easily. Prohibiting the implementation of golden parachutes during takeovers
creates an incentive for corporations to adopt golden parachutes prior to a takeover, thereby avoiding
the above-mentioned problems.
59. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. ECON. 110,
112-13 (1965). Manne argues that the market for corporate control provides incentives for executives
to maximize profits and asserts that executive inefficiency is reflected in stock prices. Thus, if an
executive does not act in the best interest of the stockholders, the stock price will fall, making the firm
a more attractive takeover prospect. Since executives are often displaced by a takeover, they will have
an incentive to maximize stock price to avoid such an event. Id. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 33, at 1168-74; Fischel, supra note 35, at 5-7; Gilson, supra note 35, at 841-45; Note, Cushion-
ing Executives, supra note 9, at 541-42.
60. See, e.g., Note, Cushioning Executives, supra note 9, at 541-42.
61. See supra note 45.
62. See supra pp. 914-17.
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crude means of disciplining managers. In large firms, where golden
parachutes are most prevalent, only the most outrageous self-dealing or
inefficiency will have an impact on share price. 8 Executives who engage
in such activity will undoubtedly experience displacement losses exceeding
the compensation provided by golden parachutes: The effects of such be-
havior on the executives' reputations will make finding similar employ-
ment more difficult."
D. Need for Golden Parachutes
Opponents of golden parachutes also argue that such agreements are
unnecessary to attract and retain quality executives.65 Golden parachutes
are certainly unnecessary in the sense that other forms of compensation
could be substituted to attract and retain executives. This does not prove,
however, that golden parachutes are without merit. As discussed above,
golden parachutes may be superior to other forms of compensation if they
simultaneously reduce agency costs and increase executive job security.
Unless opponents of golden parachutes can show that elimination of these
agreements would not be offset by increased compensation in other forms,
they cannot argue persuasively that golden parachutes are not useful in
attracting and retaining executives. 66
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO REVIEWING GOLDEN PARACHUTES
The controversy concerning the desirability and effectiveness of golden
parachutes is by no means settled. The most common attacks on golden
parachutes are not entirely convincing, and reasonable arguments support
63. In a multi-million dollar corporation, an executive can engage in self-dealing that costs the
company tens of thousands of dollars without noticeably affecting share price. Moreover, in many
cases, the transaction costs of taking over a company will exceed the costs of executive self-dealing,
making a takeover attempt unprofitable and therefore unlikely. See Vagts, supra note 27, at 239.
64. Since golden parachutes compensate only the displacement losses of competent executives, the
increased losses suffered by incompetent or dishonest executives will not be compensated by golden
parachutes. Therefore, incompetent or dishonest executives will not be able to escape market discipline
through golden parachutes.
65. See Cooper, supra note 45, at 68; Morrison, supra note 38, at 86; Riger, supra note 9, at
28-30.
66. It is reasonable to believe that the added compensation provided by golden parachutes is nec-
essary to retain executives. The ease of entry and the substantial pool of talent should make the
market for corporate executives a competitive one. Assuming that it is competitive, one would expect
salaries not to exceed the amount required to attract executives. See Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL EcoN. 288 (1980); Shavell, supra note 36.
The question concerning golden parachutes should not be "do they make executives act differ-
ently?" but rather "would executives demand other compensation to act the same if their golden
parachutes were taken from them?" Joseph Flom, a merger and acquisition specialist with Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, claims that golden parachutes "are so common that a management that
refuses them might very well risk losing the services of a number of key employees." Morrison, supra
note 38, at 83.
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the view that golden parachutes can be useful in reducing agency costs
and attracting executives. It thus would be premature for courts to adopt a
draconian standard of review that would severely limit the use of golden
parachutes. Admittedly, golden parachutes are sometimes abused. The
business judgment rule, however, provides a doctrinal basis for a two-
tiered standard of review that could eliminate current abuses without un-
duly restricting corporations' ability to use golden parachutes.
A. The Proper Standard of Review
The business judgment rule requires that courts defer to boards' good
faith decisions concerning management compensation packages. 67 When
deciding whether a board has acted in good faith in determining executive
compensation, courts typically require that the compensation bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the services performed by the executive.6 8 If the
services provided by the executive are wholly unrelated to the compensa-
tion given, the board's decision will be invalidated as corporate waste.6 9
Courts seldom invalidate compensation packages as being so excessive
that they are not reasonably related to executives' efforts.70 Rather, courts
generally defer to board decisions concerning the overall level of executive
compensation. 71 Consequently, courts probably will not invalidate most
compensation packages containing golden parachutes on the grounds that
the compensation provided is excessive. Courts are, however, more critical
of compensation plans that are structured so as not to be reasonably re-
lated to the executives' efforts. For example, courts have invalidated pen-
sion plans implemented when executives covered by the plans were near
retirement. 2
By requiring courts to defer to board decisions involving executive com-
pensation only when that compensation is reasonably related to executive
efforts, the business judgment rule provides a doctrinal basis for invalidat-
ing wasteful golden parachutes. Desirable golden parachutes that serve as
67. See supra notes 18-19.
68. See, e.g., Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652, 656-58 (1952);
see also N. LArIN, LArrIN ON CORPORATIONS 266 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing business judgment
rule).
69. Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 652-58.
70. But see Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (executive bonuses invalidated as excessive).
71. See, e.g., McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877, 883-85 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Shlensky v. Wrigely, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 183, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781
(1968); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd on rehearing, 29 N.Y.S.2d 702, affd,
263 A.D. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941).
72. See Fogelson v. American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1948).
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risk-shifting devices provide compensation that is reasonably related to ex-
ecutives' efforts. Such golden parachutes give executives continued protec-
tion from displacement losses as long as the executives perform their du-
ties.73 Correspondingly, abusive golden parachutes that go beyond risk
shifting and give executives payments in excess of their displacement
losses are not reasonably related to executives' efforts. Such payments are
unearned bonuses that are contingent upon the occurrence of a takeover,
an event which bears no logical relationship to the executives' efforts.7 4 In
short, risk-shifting golden parachutes satisfy the business judgment rule's
"reasonable relationship" requirement while wasteful golden parachutes
that go beyond risk shifting do not.
The above discussion suggests that courts should apply a two-tiered ap-
proach to determining the legality of compensation packages containing
golden parachutes. Courts should first address the more traditional ques-
tion associated with the business judgment rule: whether the entire com-
pensation provided by the package is so excessive that it could not be rea-
sonably related to the executives' efforts. Although courts will seldom
invalidate golden parachutes on this basis, 5 the question must be ad-
dressed to ensure that what appear to be legally permissible golden
parachutes are not being added to compensation plans that are already at
the limit of reasonableness. If the total compensation is reasonable, courts
must then determine whether the golden parachutes involved serve as risk-
shifting devices and are, therefore, structured so as to relate reasonably to
the efforts they are intended to compensate. This second level of inquiry
provides the stronger weapon against abusive golden parachutes and is
well within the bounds of permissible review under the business judgment
rule.
73. As mentioned earlier, a golden parachute that shifts risk is similar to an employee accident
insurance program. The value of the golden parachute is equal to the premium one would have to pay
to purchase similar insurance. The compensation provided is related to the employee's efforts because
the employee knows that if she fulfills her obligations she will then receive the insurance.
74. Golden parachutes that go beyond risk shifting are similar to an annual employee lottery
through which a lucky employee receives additional "compensation" from the company. The addi-
tional compensation is not related to the employee's efforts. An employee can work diligently and
receive all or nothing. See generally Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (bonus payments that
bear no relationship to value of services for which they are given constitute gift of corporate funds); I
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 244 n.186 (3d
ed. 1962) ("As to bonuses and similar retroactive increases of salary except where there has been an
expressed or implied understanding that they may be granted if conditions warrant, there is no consid-
eration for them.").
75. See supra notes 18-20.
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B. Identifying Risk-Shifting Golden Parachutes
In evaluating whether a golden parachute facilitates risk shifting, a
court should examine both the components of the golden parachute and
the extent of its coverage.
1. Components
As noted earlier, golden parachutes contain three key components: a
change-of-control clause, a termination clause, and a compensation clause.
Courts should scrutinize carefully each of these components to ensure that
they facilitate risk shifting. The purpose of the change-of-control clause,
which describes the circumstances under which a golden parachute be-
comes operative,"8 is to identify changes in the corporation that are likely
to threaten an executive's career status. 7 The clause should thus identify
as trigger events only those changes that could have such an effect. The
difficulty in defining a change of control makes any guideline somewhat
arbitrary,78 but most golden parachutes require at least a twenty-percent
stock acquisition or a change in a majority of the directors in order for
them to become operative. 9 Courts should carefully scrutinize golden
parachutes with change-of-control clauses that deviate significantly from
these norms. If it appears that the golden parachutes can become operative
in situations that obviously do not threaten the executives, the golden
parachutes should be invalidated.
The termination clause specifies when an executive has suffered suffi-
cient losses from a takeover to warrant allowing the executive to receive
his or her golden parachute benefits and terminate employment with the
corporation. s Because the purpose of golden parachutes is to protect exec-
utives from the adverse consequences of takeovers, golden parachutes that
give managers an unconditional right of termination should be invalidated.
The mere fact that the corporation has been taken over should not be a
sufficient basis for an executive's terminating his or her employment and
receiving golden parachute payments. 81 On the other hand, because an
76. Profusek, supra note 10, at 105-07.
77. Id.
78. The actual percentage of stock one must hold in order effectively to control a corporation
varies according to the circumstances. For example, in a firm with only a few shareholders, all of
which are actively interested in how the firm is managed, one may need 51% of the firm's stock in
order to control the corporation. W. CARY & M. EISEsBERG, supra note 19, at 208-12. In contrast,
in a large corporation with thousands of stockholders which are, for the most part, not interested in
the general management of the firm, a person holding 10% of the corporation's stock may be able to
exert considerable influence over the corporation. Id.
79. Ward Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 3.
80. Profusek, supra note 10, at 107.
81. Allowing executives the right to receive their golden parachute benefits and terminate their
employment following a takeover which has not adversely affected the executives is inconsistent with
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acquiring company can make life miserable for incumbent executives
without actually dismissing them, golden parachutes that require execu-
tives only to make a good faith showing of a material, adverse change in
their duties or conditions of employment should not be invalidated.
Since golden parachutes are intended to compensate executives for dis-
placement losses, 2 the compensation clause should reflect the expected
magnitude of those losses. Boards should consider factors relevant to an
executive's ability to gain new employment, such as age, transferability of
skills, and labor-market conditions, when setting the level of compensation
to be provided. If it is clear that no such evaluation was made, a court
should consider invalidating the golden parachute. For example, a court
should invalidate a golden parachute which provides an executive with
continued compensation beyond the time the executive normally would
have retired.
Because many displacement losses are subjective, it often will be diffi-
cult for courts to determine whether golden parachute payments are exces-
sive. The only clear cases will be those involving golden parachutes that
obviously reflect an attempt to provide compensation in excess of displace-
ment losses. A number of recent developments will, however, help elimi-
nate golden parachutes with excessive compensation clauses. Under the
recently enacted Deficit Reduction Act,"3 golden parachutes that give ex-
ecutives payments greater than or equal to three times their total annual
compensation are presumed excessive for tax purposes, resulting in the
corporation's losing its deduction for the golden parachute payments as
well as in the imposition of a twenty-percent excise tax on the benefi-
ciaries of the payments.84 The Act will not directly eliminate excessive
golden parachute payments because it does not forbid payments of any
the view that golden parachutes compensate executives by shifting a risk of loss, because no loss need
occur in order for the payments to be made.
When Morton-Norwich acquired Thiokol Corporation, a number of Thiokol executives terminated
their employment and received golden parachute payments, although they apparently had not suffered
significant displacement losses. Thiokol's President, Robert Davis, reportedly took his four-million
dollar golden parachute because "it stuck in his craw not to be CEO." Other executives took their
golden parachutes because they were nearing retirement or just did not want to work for Morton.
Dorfman, The Thiokol Defections, FORBES, Mar. 28, 1983, at 110. Arguably, these golden parachutes
went beyond risk shifting by having termination clauses that allowed the golden parachutes to become
operative before their recipients suffered significant losses.
82. Profusek, supra note 10, at 108.
83. Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
84. Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 67, 98 Stat. 494 (to be
codified at I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999), "excess parachute payments" paid or accrued are not deductible to
the corporation. Furthermore, a non-deductible 20% excise tax is imposed on the beneficiary of the
"excess parachute payments." The provision only applies to golden parachutes that provide payments
equal to or in excess of three times the employee's base amount. The "base amount" is the employee's
average annualized gross income from the corporation over the five-taxable-year period preceding the
taxable year in which the change of ownership or control occurs. Special provisions apply if the
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magnitude.8 5 Nevertheless, it is still likely to deter corporations from im-
plementing golden parachutes that give benefits equal to or in excess of
three years' compensation, particularly when courts are likely to scrutinize
closely golden parachute payments which are deemed excessive under the
tax laws. Because most golden parachutes give executives benefits equal to
or less than their compensation for three years,86 the new legislation will
help eliminate the more serious abuses without severely restricting the use
of golden parachutes. The increased disclosure of golden parachutes now
required under the federal securities laws8 7 will probably also serve as a
significant check on the implementation of golden parachutes that provide
unreasonably large benefits.88 This is particularly likely given the hostile
reaction that excessive golden parachutes have received in the press after
their disclosure.8"
employee has worked less than five years. "Excess parachute payments" are those parachute pay-
ments that exceed the "base amount" and are not reasonable compensation for personal services actu-
ally rendered by the employee. It is presumed that no golden parachute payment is reasonable com-
pensation for personal services actually rendered. The presumption may be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence. See generally H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess, 849-54, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 751, 843-47 (describing the new tax law pertaining to golden
parachutes).
85. See id. While the prospect of losing substantially all of the corporation's tax deduction and
causing a 20% excise tax to be imposed on a large portion of the golden parachute payments will deter
some corporations from adopting excessive golden parachutes, it will not directly eliminate all such
abuses. Because the legislation applies only to golden parachutes that provide benefits equal to or in
excess of an amount equal to three times the executive's salary, many golden parachutes will not be
affected. (In its survey of golden parachutes among executives of Fortune 1000 companies, Ward
Howell found that 51.1% of golden parachutes provide payments equal to or less than three times the
executives' annual salary. See Ward Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 4. Moreover, 25.9% of the
golden parachutes reviewed had compensation provisions not expressed as a multiple of the executive's
annual income and could therefore involve payments of less than three times the executive's annual
income. Id.) More importantly, the provision makes no attempt to distinguish between golden
parachutes that compensate through risk shifting and those that simply provide displaced executives
with unearned bonuses. Finally, the legislation ignores the "final period problems" surrounding a
takeover: If directors are willing to adopt golden parachutes that are harmful to the corporation, it is
unclear that denying the corporation a deduction for these golden parachutes after a change of control
occurs-and the directors are probably replaced-will discourage the directors from implementing the
golden parachutes. Similarly, the 20% excise tax can be shifted from the executives to the acquiring
corporation merely by increasing the golden parachute payments by the amount of the tax.
86. See Ward Howell Survey, supra note 2, at 4.
87. "Responding in part to the increasing use of 'golden parachute' arrangements and to the
recommendation of its advisory committee on tender offers, the SEC, in new paragraph (e) of Item
402 of Regulation S-K, has expanded the language of old paragraph (i) of Item 402 specifically to
require disclosure of plans or arrangements for additional compensation that will be triggered by a
change of control of the issuer or a change in the executive's responsibilities as well as those triggered
by termination of employment." Spencer & Olson, Dissonant Chorus Greets SEC Proxy, Perk Rule
Changes, Legal Times of Wash., Nov. 7, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
88. As Justice Brandeis once wrote, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see
generally Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP.
L. 1 (1983) (discussing rationale for disclosure requirements).
89. See, e.g., "Golden Parachutes"for Ousted, New York Times, April 6, 1982, at LI, col. 2.
The Yale Law Journal
2. Coverage
In addition to reviewing the three common components of golden para-
chutes, a court should also review the list of employees in a corporation
which are covered by golden parachutes. Golden parachutes are intended
to compensate employees by shifting takeover risks from the employees to
the corporation. Golden parachutes given to employees who are not sub-
ject to such risks are not compensatory and are therefore wasteful. More-
over, such golden parachutes do not fulfill the other economic func-
tions-reduction of agency costs and encouragement of firm-specific
specialization-that risk-shifting golden parachutes serve. Instead, they
give employees an unexpected bonus in the event of a takeover.90 Since
lower-level executives and non-management employees are unlikely to
suffer displacement losses as a result of a takeover, courts must carefully
scrutinize golden parachutes that purport to compensate such employees
through risk shifting.
CONCLUSION
The more notorious golden parachutes contain unconditional rights of
termination or other clearly abusive terms. The approach proposed above,
which is grounded in the business judgment rule, can eliminate such
abuses. In addition, this two-tiered standard of review will not unduly
impede the ability of corporations to reduce agency costs and attract exec-
utives through the use of reasonable golden parachutes.
-Kenneth C. Johnsen
90. In 1982, Beneficial Corporation provided 234 employees with golden parachutes. Morrison,
supra note 38, at 86. It is doubtful that all of these employees would have suffered significant losses
in the event of a takeover. It is even more questionable that providing these employees with golden
parachutes reduced agency costs.
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